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“Random Recollections”

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS*

This evening I am not going to try to deliver a scholarly dissertation.
This is the 20th lecture in a series honoring a good friend and former
teacher who had a profound influence on my career. Instead of providing
you with novel insights about arcane propositions of law, I merely
propose to share certain personal memories with you regarding my
former colleagues on the Supreme Court. But first, to confirm my
disclaimer of any heavy lifting, I shall begin by recalling a conversation
with Professor Nathanson about an incident that occurred shortly after he
began serving as a law clerk to Justice Brandeis.
At that time the Justices did most of their work at home. Justice
Brandeis had asked Nat to prepare a certain legal memorandum for him,
and to deliver it at an early hour on the following morning by slipping it
under the front door of his residence. Nat told me that he met the
deadline, but when he started to push the memo under the door, it was
silently pulled into the house. I don’t recall what Nat had to say about
the aftermath of that incident but I’m sure that it encouraged on-time
deliveries of future memos.
When I last visited your beautiful campus in 1984, my attempt to explain
how profoundly Professor Nathanson had influenced my understanding of
the law included comments on why students referred to his
constitutional law class as “Nate’s Mystery Hour” and how he warned us
to beware of “glittering generalities.” Today, as a preface to sharing
some random reminiscences about my departed colleagues, I want to
mention three post-graduate incidents in which Nat played an important
role in furthering my legal education.
* Speech given as part of the Nathaniel L. Nathanson Memorial Lecture series at
the University of San Diego School of Law on April 7, 2004.
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The first was his pro bono representation of a prison inmate named
Arthur La Frana, who had confessed to the murder of a theater cashier in
1937. After repeated denials of La Frana’s pro se attempts to obtain a
hearing in which he could challenge the voluntariness of his confession,
Nat was appointed to represent him. Nat persuaded the United States
Supreme Court that if La Frana’s allegations of physical torture were
true, his confession was involuntary and his conviction should be set aside.1
The Court’s order on remand led to an evidentiary hearing before an
Illinois trial judge. Because Nat’s extensive experience in litigation had
primarily involved appellate advocacy, he asked me to handle the
investigation and trial of the confession issue. The results of that work
are described in an opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court that was
announced in 1954 and led to La Frana’s release.2 What I learned from
that case has no doubt had an impact on my work on the Supreme Court,
where we must frequently resolve issues relating to the timeliness of
post-conviction claims and the voluntariness of statements made to the
police by persons in custody.
My second post-graduate incident involved work as a member of the
Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
which was appointed by Herbert Brownell in 1953. I worked on a task
force that prepared the first draft of the portion of the Committee’s
Report that dealt with exemptions from the antitrust laws. Because of
Nat’s national reputation as an expert in administrative law, the cochairmen of the Committee asked him to participate in our work in an
advisory capacity, and he graciously agreed to do so. The Committee
hoped that we would be able to identify certain unifying principles that
would lead to the endorsement of rules applicable to every statute that
included an antitrust exemption. The result of our efforts, however, was
not a bright-line rule or set of rules, but a recommendation to read each
federal regulatory statute with great care because each provides its own
solutions to the specific problems that Congress confronted.3 Over the
years, my recollection of Nat’s comments during those working sessions
have come to mind when the Court is asked to apply so-called “Chevron
deference”4 to an executive agency’s decision. While my colleagues
wrestle with the continuing attempt to provide more detailed guidance
than is available in the Chevron opinion itself, I am constantly reminded
1. Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104, 104 (1951).
2. People v. La Frana, 122 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. 1954).
3. Our conclusions—after extensive editing and reediting by the Committee and
its staff—are summarized in Chapter VI of the Committee’s final report. REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 261–313
(1955).
4. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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that every regulatory statute has its own unique features. Moreover,
unlike some of my colleagues I seldom regard the answer to the question
whether Chevron applies as necessarily ending the inquiry, because a
judge who is convinced that an agency misconstrued a statute always
retains the option of deciding that the agency’s decision was “unreasonable.”
My third memory is of an article that Nat co-authored with one of his
students at Northwestern University Law School, which was published
in the Chicago Bar Record in 1977 on the subject of affirmative action.5
The article was important because it so lucidly identified valid arguments
on both sides of the issue, and raised the possibility that resolution of the
issue may have a temporal dimension: An answer that is correct today
may not be correct in years to come. It is significant that Justice
O’Connor cited Nat’s article in the concluding portion of her opinion last
Term in the Michigan Law School case, Grutter v. Bollinger.6 That article
displays the thoughtfulness and attention to nuance that is evident in all
of Nat’s work. I have thought of him frequently during my years on the
Court, and I continue to benefit from the many lessons he taught me.
The Supreme Court that I joined in 1975 was divided five-to-four in a
significant respect. It included five members who were at least six feet
tall and a minority of relatively short justices. The fact that Potter Stewart
and I were both in that minority is only one of the many reasons why we
became such good friends immediately after I arrived. My opinion that
he probably had the keenest intellect of any judge with whom I have
served may be attributable, in part, to the fact that while I was on the
Court of Appeals, in every case in which the Supreme Court ruled on an
issue that I confronted as a circuit judge, Potter reached the same
conclusion that I had. His opinion for the Court in Roudebush v. Hartke7
was particularly gratifying because it reversed a three-judge district
court order from which I had dissented. The order had enjoined a recount
in an election to the United States Senate “based on a finding that a recount
would increase the probability of election fraud and accidental destruction
of ballots.”8 Potter’s opinion simply rejected that finding.
Potter had an unusually deep bass voice. On occasion, during oral

5. Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Casimir J. Bartnik, The Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 CHIC. BAR REC. 282
(May–June 1977).
6. 539 U.S. 306, 342–43 (2003).
7. 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
8. Id. at 26.
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argument he would whisper rather candid comments about the quality of
counsel’s performance that were intended to be heard only by his neighbor
on the bench but, as I remember them, practically reverberated throughout
the courtroom. Potter also is the Justice who told me that John Harlan had
asked him to make sure to preserve the tradition of making at least one oral
announcement of a dissenting opinion each Term. It was shortly after
Byron White and I advised Justice Scalia of that tradition that he delivered
his first, and probably most notable, oral dissent in the independent counsel
case.9
In our conferences Potter displayed an extraordinary ability to state the
issues, and his appraisal of each one, succinctly and accurately. He was a
gifted writer and wrote many important, well reasoned opinions, but he is
probably best remembered for his candid confession of his inability to
define obscenity coupled with his confident assertion that he knew it when
he saw it.10 Because that terse comment is at the opposite end of the spectrum
from the statement of a black-letter rule, it illustrates the difference
between the exercise of judgment, on the one hand, and the crafting of
legislative rules, on the other. The comment in his separate opinion in
Furman v. Georgia—which I remember him telling me was written on a
weekend shortly before the case was announced—to the effect that the
imposition of the death penalty is as arbitrary as being struck by lightning,
reflects a similar exercise of judgment.11
Potter Stewart was the first of my colleagues to retire. He left office on
July 3rd, 1981. As was true of all but one of those who followed him, he
surprised his brethren by announcing his decision to do so on the last day
of a Term. It was five years later, at the end of the October 1985 Term,
that Warren Burger informed us that he was retiring from his position as
Chief Justice in order to have more time to contribute to the bicentennial
celebration of the Constitution. The Chief’s avid interest in the history of
our country and of the Court was surely a factor that led to that decision
and to his work in creating the Supreme Court Historical Society, and the
office of the Curator of the Court. He was, however, a truly modern
administrator. He came up with the idea to color-code the briefs, and to
require parties to print the question presented on the first page. And he is
primarily responsible for the introduction of the word-processors and
computer technology that replaced the out-dated hot lead print shop that
had often delayed our adjournment for several days at the end of June or
early in July. The Chief also literally changed the shape of the Court, by
ordering our carpenter to cut the Bench into three sections and move each
9.
10.
11.
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of the two ends far enough forward to enable the two junior justices to see
one another. He was a graceful and courteous presiding officer in Court
Sessions. On rare occasions he even allowed a lawyer whose time had
been consumed by vigorous and competitive questioning from the Bench,
to take two or three extra minutes to complete sentences that had been
somewhat rudely interrupted.
Among his hobbies was a knowledge of fine wines. Before I arrived, he
introduced the custom of celebrating each Justice’s birthday with a toast at
lunch, followed by a hearty rendition of “Happy Birthday to whomever.”
We still follow that custom, and I must say that Clarence Thomas has
significantly improved the quality of our singing.
As Chief Justice, Warren Burger wrote many important opinions for the
Court. My two favorites are Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,12 the snail
darter case, which contains both an elegant statement about the importance
of the rule of law and a careful examination of relevant legislative history,
and Reed v. Reed,13 the ground-breaking decision that repudiated outmoded
stereotypical thinking about the proper role of women in our society. The
Reed opinion conveyed its central message without needing to construct
either a two-tiered or three-tiered method of analyzing Equal Protection
issues. As his decision to join my separate opinion in the Cleburne14 case
demonstrated, the Chief and I shared the view that a proper interpretation
of the rational basis requirement will produce a more reliable and more
consistent definition of the sovereign’s duty to govern impartially than an
attempt to cram every case into the appropriate tier in a judicially-crafted
hierarchy.
After announcing our opinions on the final decision day at the end of
each Term, we hold a brief conference to dispose of loose ends, such as
certiorari petitions that have been held pending the disposition of argued
cases. It was at that Conference at the end of June in 1987, that Lewis
Powell informed us of his decision to retire. Lewis had been my neighbor
on the Bench throughout my tenure—we had both moved from the left
wing to the right wing when Potter Stewart retired, and back to the left
when Warren Burger had stepped down. Although Lewis’ career in private
practice outdistanced mine by hundreds of miles, there were parallels in
our pre-judicial histories that made us especially close. We were both
12. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
13. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
14. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451–55 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
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engaged in intelligence work in World War II, we shared the view that trial
work can improve the quality of a lawyer’s judgment, and we agreed that
bar associations play an important role in maintaining the quality and the
independence of the legal profession.
We had numerous conversations about our respective experiences but,
with two exceptions that I recall, we did not discus cases before they were
argued. The first exception was the series of cases argued in the 1975 term
involving the constitutionality of capital punishment in which we were
both convinced that the mandatory death penalty was invalid.15 The
second was the Wygant case involving a Michigan school board’s decision
to retain minority faculty members rather than more senior white teachers
when it became necessary to reduce the size of the faculty.16 As I was
leaving his office after a conversation on an unrelated subject, we both
remarked on the fact that our next affirmative action argument was in an
“easy case.” It was only later that we both learned that we thought it easy
for opposite reasons. He wrote the plurality opinion holding that the policy
was unconstitutional, and I dissented arguing that in cases of this kind we
should focus on the future rather than the past.
In part because we disagreed from time to time, and in part because I had
so much respect for his judgment, I always was especially gratified to learn
that Lewis agreed with my views. On one occasion, it was only after the
case had been decided that he came to agree with me. He did not join my
criticism of political gerrymandering in Karcher v. Daggett,17 the New
Jersey case, but he endorsed and improved on that opinion a few years later
when he dissented in Davis v. Bandemer,18 a case involving political
gerrymandering in Indiana.
My fond memories of Lewis are too numerous to describe, but three
characteristics stand out: he was an exceptionally wise man; he was a true
gentleman; and he fervidly loved his country.
At our final conference of the 1989 Term Bill Brennan told us that his
doctor had advised him to retire and he had decided to do so. Bill was
easily the most gregarious, friendly and outgoing member of the Court.
During my first year on the Court I happened to tell him that I was not
going to accept an invitation to attend the Grid Iron Club Dinner—the
annual off-the-record affair at which members of the press roast the
President and other political leaders—because I did not have the white-tieand-tails that the invitation mandated. He simply overruled me. He
insisted that I had to attend at least the first such dinner during my tenure
15. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976).
16. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
17. 462 U.S. 725, 744–65 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
18. 478 U.S. 109, 161–85 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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and that there was no merit to my excuse because I could fit into his set of
tails, and promptly delivered them to me. The fit was not exactly perfect,
but I accepted and have been eternally grateful for a generous act that made
it possible for me to spend an evening with the still-gorgeous and charming
Ginger Rogers as my dinner partner.
Years later, during the interval between the death of Bill’s first wife,
Marge, and his marriage to Mary, Bill had dinner with Maryan and me in
our apartment in Arlington on several occasions. He would ride home with
me and, after dinner, one of the Court’s police officers would drive him
home. My route takes me over the 14th Street Bridge, where the competition
between lane-changing drivers during rush hour is occasionally fairly
intense. Because I have always believed that an offense is the best defense
in such situations, at least one of those trips made such an indelible
impression on Bill—as I later learned from one of the officers who often
drove Bill to work—that thereafter he insisted that they use the Memorial
Street Bridge rather than the 14th whenever he was in the car.
Bill’s contribution to the work of the Court is legendary. I think I
remember him saying that Goldberg v. Kelly,19 was his favorite opinion,
but I would rank three others as even more significant: Baker v. Carr20
replaced Justice Frankfurter’s political thicket metaphor with a smooth
road to our one-person one vote cases; New York Times v. Sullivan21
constitutionalized a major part of our defamation law; and his plurality
opinion in Elrod v. Burns22 took aim at the patronage system. My partiality
to Elrod is probably based on its endorsement of the most controversial
majority opinion that I wrote as a court of appeals judge.23
On the last day of the 1990 Term, Thurgood Marshall expressed his
vehement disagreement with the majority’s decision to allow the prosecution
to use victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of capital cases.24 He
was particularly upset by the fact that the new majority on the Court had
decided to overrule an opinion that Lewis Powell had announced only four
years earlier.25 We then came off the bench for our final conference of the
term and he told us that he had decided to retire.
I had first seen Thurgood in action when I was a law clerk during the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
427 U.S. 347 (1976).
See Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972).
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
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1947 Term. His oral argument in Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma26 persuaded the Court to enter a unanimous
order in the following week requiring the all-white University of
Oklahoma School of Law to admit an African-American applicant. I
also heard his argument in Shelley v. Kraemer,27 the restrictive covenant
case. He was an excellent advocate. Responding to a barrage of questions
from Justice Frankfurter, he displayed a rare combination of respect for
his interrogator and firm confidence in his interpretation of earlier case
law. It was only later that I learned about his amazing career as a trial
lawyer who participated in case after case in the hostile environment that
prevailed in courthouses throughout the South in those days.
I first met Thurgood at a meeting in Chicago when he was the Circuit
Justice for the Seventh Circuit. In answer to a question about the personal
relationships among members of the Court, he described them as extremely
cordial. Remembering a contrary impression that I had formed during
my year as a law clerk, I remember thinking that he might not have been
entirely candid. After joining the Court, I learned how wrong I was.
Not only did I find that his statement had been completely accurate, but I
also acquired a first hand appreciation and understanding of a truly great
man’s character and candor. Thurgood possessed in full measure the
most important virtue that every successful trial lawyer absolutely needs.
His word was good.
Thurgood’s contributions to our conference discussions of argued cases
were especially valuable for many reasons, three of which I shall briefly
mention. First, was his vast repertoire of humorous stories: he seemed to
have a joke for every occasion. Unlike most raconteurs, however, he never
told us the same story twice. Second, he had a remarkable ability to see
both sides of issues that involve conflicts between state authority and
individual rights. Insights derived from his work as a defense lawyer and a
leader in the civil rights movement were balanced against insights derived
from his experience representing the government during his tenure as
Solicitor General, and perhaps of greater importance, by his intimate
knowledge of the risks faced by police officers in the line of duty. He was
extremely proud of his son John who served as a Virginia State Trooper,
and frequently spoke about him. Finally, the breadth of Thurgood’s work
as a trial lawyer gave him a special perspective in many cases: time after
time he would recall an actual experience that was both interesting and
directly relevant to the issue we were discussing. Thurgood’s view that we
should do away with peremptory challenges, which he expressed in his

26.
27.
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separate opinion in Batson v. Kentucky,28 was especially persuasive given
his vast experience at the trial level. Indeed, although at the beginning of
my career I viewed the arbitrary right to exclude potential jurors as a
fundamental procedural protection, I ultimately came to agree with
Thurgood that the costs of peremptory challenges likely outweigh the
benefits.29
My wife, Maryan, always thought of Thurgood as a special friend. She
and Thurgood shared a great sense of humor—in fact, their relationship
started with a joke. Maryan is a sun-worshiper who is especially beautiful
after long hours on the Florida beach. When she first met Thurgood, he
complimented her on her tan, but warned her that his would always be
better. Maryan and I were particularly proud of the fact that we were
invited to attend the special party that some of Thurgood’s oldest friends
hosted to celebrate his eightieth birthday. I liked to think that we were
included because Thurgood thought well of my work on the Court. After
reflecting about Maryan’s friendship with both Thurgood and his lovely
wife, Cissy, however, I have concluded that the credit was really hers.
I first met Byron White at Pearl Harbor during World War II. The
incident was memorable for me because he had achieved national fame as
a football great. My immediate impression, which was confirmed years
later, was that he was the kind of person that I would want as a friend. As I
was to learn later, he performed with true heroism when the aircraft carrier
on which he was serving was attacked by Kamikaze pilots. The fact that
he was a genuine war hero, as well as an all-American athlete, a Rhodes
Scholar, and a nice guy, certainly qualified him to serve as a law clerk to
Chief Justice Vinson during the 1946 Term.
The duties of the Chief’s clerks at that time included the preparation of
memos that were circulated to the entire court making recommendations
for the disposition of in forma pauperis cases, most of which were habeas
corpus petitions that were denied because the applicant had not exhausted
his state remedies. I read a number of those memos during my clerkship in
the following term, having been cautioned by my boss, Justice Rutledge, to
examine them with particular care because he felt that the Vinson
Chambers might overlook a meritorious claim. I don’t remember any
flaws in the memos that were signed “BRW.”
28. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (arguing in favor of “eliminating
peremptory challenges entirely in criminal cases”).
29. See Justice John Paul Stevens, Foreword: Introduction to the Jury at a Crossroad:
The American Experience, 78 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 907 (2003).
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Our paths crossed shortly after Byron began his service as Deputy
Attorney General during the Kennedy administration. He asked me if I
would be interested in serving as the head of the antitrust division, but I
never had to give him a definite answer because Bobby Kennedy had other
plans. Years later when I arrived at the Court, Byron welcomed me with
genuine enthusiasm. We immediately formed a true friendship that never
diminished. Among our mutual interests was the game of golf, which
Byron loved. On Monday mornings when he inquired about my weekend
game, rather than embarrassing me by asking what I shot, he would usually
ask me how many pars I had. The question had the special virtue of
reminding us that it is far more important to remember one’s good shots
than to dwell on the inevitable bad ones.
During my first term Byron taught me the important lesson that there is a
big difference between receiving an assignment to write a majority opinion
and actually delivering such an opinion. I was assigned the opinion in the
Buffalo Forge case30 and congratulated myself when my circulating draft
garnered an unexpected vote. My enthusiasm came to an abrupt halt,
however, when two Justices who had voted with me at Conference were
persuaded by Byron’s dissent. In the few days remaining at the end of the
Term, he converted his dissent into a Court opinion holding that the NorrisLaGuardia Act barred the district court from enjoining a sympathy strike,
and I had to rewrite the opening and closing paragraphs of what had
become an inappropriately long dissenting opinion. That sort of switch has
happened far more often than most court-watchers realize.
As would be expected of a great athlete, Byron was a team player,
having expertise in all aspects of the Court’s work. His contributions in
cases on our original docket, and in the processing of certiorari petitions,
revealed the same thorough and careful preparation that characterized his
work on the most interesting and controversial argued cases. There were
occasions when he disagreed with the majority, but decided to file what he
called a “graveyard dissent”—in other words, he would refrain from the
publication of his contrary view. He wrote a famous dissent in the
Miranda case,31 but ultimately accepted it as the law and wrote the opinion
in Edwards v. Arizona32 that expanded on Miranda’s holding. Although he
had written the opinion in Swain v. Alabama33 in 1965, Byron joined Lewis
Powell’s opinion in 1986 in Batson v. Kentucky34 that virtually overruled
Swain.
My opinion for the Court in the Chevron case has been cited more
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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frequently than any other opinion that I have written. I have always been
grateful to Byron for asking me to write it. He was the assigning Justice
because his two seniors, Warren Burger and Billy Brennan, had voted to
affirm at the Conference following oral argument. I am sure that it was my
thorough analysis of the facts, rather than any comment on the deference to
be accorded to the agency, that persuaded both of them to switch sides and
give me a unanimous Court. The opinion has been the subject of more
scholarly comment than it really deserves, but the fact that only six Justices
participated in the decision of the case is usually overlooked. It is because
the only Justices other than myself who are still serving both disqualified
themselves (as did Thurgood Marshall) that I feel free to identify the
assigning Justice in the case.
After Byron retired in the spring of 1993, Harry Blackmun became the
senior associate justice. Whenever the Chief Justice was in dissent, Harry
would be responsible for the assignment of the Court opinion, assuming of
course that he was in the majority. It is my recollection that he always
showed me the courtesy of asking me for my thoughts before he actually
made any such assignments. Harry was a sensitive and thoughtful human
being. He had a degree in mathematics and resolutely refused to join any
opinion that made the common mistake of using the term “parameter” as a
synonym for “perimeter.” Harry was meticulous about all his work,
frequently checking citations himself. Whenever we agreed that an
opinion was ready to be announced, we would check with Harry to make
sure that it did not include any citations to cases that had not yet been
released. One almost never caught Harry in a mistake of any kind, so I
took special pleasure in calling his attention to our first meeting.
When I was on the Court of Appeals I owned a single-engine Cessna 172
and often made brief flights on weekends. When I learned that Harry was
going to make a commencement talk at a college in an Indiana town with a
municipal airport, I decided to fly there and introduce myself to the new
Justice. When I met him, I explained that I was a recent appointee to the
Seventh Circuit. He could not have been nicer to me. Indeed, after he
returned to Washington he took the time to write me a friendly letter
commenting on our meeting. The letter, however, was addressed to Judge
Robert Sprecher, who had just joined our court. Because Harry had
understandably assumed that he had been accosted by the most junior
judge on the Seventh Circuit, he made a rare but entirely forgivable
mistake.
Harry and I both had Illinois roots and shared the perennial frustration of
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being ardent Cub fans. Although Harry was a “work-a-holic,” he found
time for cultural pursuits. In the summer he and Norval Morris regularly
presided over a scholarly seminar at the Aspen Institute in Aspen, Colorado.
Harry’s repeated attendance at the Aspen music festival explains his
leadership in establishing the delightful musicale that is now an annual
spring event at the Court. He was even able to persuade acclaimed violinist
Robert McDuffie to perform (with his 3.5 million dollar Stradivarius) at the
musicale on several occasions. Harry also was one of the three judges in
the moot court argument at American University in which the authorship of
the Shakespeare canon was debated. Bill Brennan presided and I was the
third member of the court. Although we held that the claim advanced by
Edward de Vere, the 17th Earl of Oxford, had not met the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard of proof, in later years both Harry and I had
second thoughts about the issue.35 If he were able to vote today, I am quite
sure that he would conclude, as I would, that the evidence supporting the
Oxfordian claim is stronger than the evidence supporting the claim of the
man from Stratford.
Harry’s most important opinion was, of course, Roe v. Wade,36 which he
wrote before I joined the Court. The bitter critics of that opinion have
generally treated Harry as a sort of special villain, solely responsible for
what they regard as a tragic misinterpretation of the Constitution. Presumably
it was one of those critics who fired a bullet through the window of Harry’s
apartment in Virginia. In placing all the blame on Harry, they conveniently
overlook the fact that his opinion spoke for seven Justices. Notwithstanding
the “wealth of legal scholarship” in that opinion—which prompted one of
the two dissenters to acknowledge that “the opinion thus commands my
respect”37—it is not at the head of the list of Blackmun opinions that I
admire. Ironically, given my firm belief in the importance of the doctrine
of stare decisis, it is his opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority38 that occupies that spot. Not only did Garcia overrule
National League of Cities v. Usery,39 but the opinion candidly referred to
the fact that Harry had provided the crucial fifth vote in that case. After
explaining why the built-in restraints in the federal system adequately
ensure that laws imposing undue burdens on the States will not be enacted,
Harry quoted a paragraph that was written by Justice Frankfurter when I
was in law school. Because that paragraph might well have been written by
Professor Nathanson, I shall conclude by reading it to you:
35. See Justice John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1373 (1992).
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. Id. at 171 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
39. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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“The process of Constitutional adjudication does not thrive on conjuring up
horrible possibilities that never happen in the real world and devising doctrines
sufficiently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest contingency. Nor
need we go beyond what is required for reasoned disposition of the kind of
controversy now before the Court.”40

Thank you for your attention.

40.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (quoting New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572,
583 (1946)).
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